Research
Research
The Rationality of Perception Is Not Inferential. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2026. [journal (open access)]
Perceptual experiences have traditionally been taken to justify belief without themselves being justified. Recently, philosophers have challenged this assumption. Proponents of what I will call 'Inferentialism' argue that some perceptual experiences are the result of an inference from other mental states, and just like inferred beliefs, that these perceptual experiences are inferentially rationally assessable. They justify beliefs only if they themselves are justified, and they are justified only if they are based on good epistemic reasons by a good inferential process. In this paper, I argue that the relevant perceptual experiences should not be understood as a result of an inference. Some perceptual experiences are rationally assessable, but we should not understand their rationality in terms of inferential norms. Instead, I propose that the rationality of perceptual experiences is accounted for by the rationality of attention.
Primitive Governance. Noûs. 2025. [journal, penultimate]
Laws of nature are sometimes said to govern their instances. Spelling out what governance is, however, is an important task that has only recently received sustained philosophical attention. In the first part of this paper, I argue against the two prominent reductive views of governance—modal views and grounding views. Ruling out the promising candidates for reduction supports the claim that governance is sui generis. In the second part of this paper, I argue that governance is subject to a contingency requirement. Laws govern their instances only if those instances are metaphysically contingent. I end by defending the resulting account of governance from two potential objections.
Essence and Explanation: A Logical Mismatch. Inquiry. 2021. (with Aaron Segal) [journal]
Let Essentialism be the view that at least some object has at least some property essentially. And let Relative Essentialism be the view that Essentialism is true, but that for any object that has any property essentially, it has it essentially only relative to the value of some parameter. Meghan Sullivan has recently put forward a promising new version of Relative Essentialism, according to which the relevant parameter is an explanatory framework. We argue that despite its promise, Sullivan's version unfortunately fails, due to the mismatch between the logic of essentiality and the logic of explanation.
A paper arguing that irrational attention can undermine justification.
A paper arguing that we cannot take perceptual experiences at face value.
A paper arguing that having evidence is a matter of degree and developing a corresponding version of Evidentialism.
A paper arguing for a non-ground-theoretic notion of fundamentality (with William Nava).
My dissertation is concerned with the role attention plays in our epistemic lives. We are generally presented with much more information than we can process. To reason with the information we have, and form beliefs on its basis, we need to prioritize—we need to attend to some pieces of information over others.
In many cases, attention is epistemically beneficial. Part of what makes birders experts in their field is the way they attend. However, attention can also go awry. We often criticize people for failing to notice something, or for overly focusing on the wrong information. Consider Annie, who attends to her professional failures and ignores her successes, and therefore concludes that she is bad at her job. There’s something amiss about Annie’s situation, but is she being irrational? And if so, is she epistemically irrational or merely prudentially so? Is Annie justified in her belief that she is bad at her job? Does she ought to attend in a different way?
My dissertation addresses these and related questions. I argue that attention does not only have epistemic consequences, but is a distinct epistemic phenomenon in itself. I propose that the rational norms on attention are inquiry-based norms, which are distinct from inferential norms. Nevertheless, I argue that (in some cases) irrational attention undermines the justification we have for resulting beliefs. Given the ubiquity of perceptual and cognitive attention, attention is not some isolated domain of epistemic concern, but part of the process epistemic agents go through when they form beliefs. Having an account of the rationality of attention is therefore vital to epistemology.